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I.

INTRODUCTION

“F

oreign terrorist fighters” are high on the agenda of the international
community. This is illustrated by the adoption in 2014 of Resolution 2178
by the United Nations Security Council in which the Council expressed
grave concern over the “acute and growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters,”1 and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, obliged member States to take a number of measures to address the threat presented by
such fighters. The international community’s focus has primarily been on
individuals present in, or intending to travel to, Syria and Iraq to join terrorist groups since it is armed groups in these two States that attract the
most fighters.
The fight against foreign terrorist fighters takes a wide range of forms,
including preventive measures to counter violent extremism and address
the conditions conducive to terrorism, military force, intelligence operations and law enforcement actions. It is also a fight in which States choose
their own approach. This choice is influenced by many different factors;
one of which is whether the State concerned is primarily a “sending” State
or a “receiving” State.
This article examines the approach taken by the Netherlands, as a sending State, predominantly in the context of the Syrian conflict.2 In April
2016, the government reported that approximately 240 individuals had
traveled from the Netherlands to Iraq and/or Syria, and that around forty
had returned to the Netherlands.3 The government has stated that those
who have returned constitute a potential threat, although this has not been
the case for the majority of individuals who have returned to date.4
As a consequence of this concern, in August 2014, the Dutch government presented an Action Program for Addressing Jihadism in an Integrated Way5 in which it set out thirty-eight measures to combat jihadism. The
program included the introduction of new measures, enhancement of exist1. S.C. Res. 2178, pmbl. ¶ 8 (Sept. 24, 2014).
2. “Conflict” is used here as shorthand. Arguably, there are two or even several armed
conflicts ongoing in Syria.
3. Parliamentary Papers II, 34356 (R2064), No. 6, Apr. 1, 2016, at 9.
4. Id. at 7.
5. Parliamentary Papers II, 29754, No. 253, Aug. 29, 2014. English translation available
at https://english.nctv.nl/Images/def-a5-nctvjihadismuk-03-lr_tcm92-562673.pdf [hereinafter Parliamentary Papers II, 29754, No. 253].
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ing measures and the continuation of some measures already in place.
Many of these measures address in whole or in part foreign terrorist fighters. This article considers those measures that have raised, or that may
raise, questions of international law, primarily those measures undertaken
in the field of law enforcement. For present purposes, law enforcement is
understood in a broad sense as including measures taken on the basis of
domestic criminal and administrative law.
At first sight, law enforcement measures appear to be regulated principally by domestic law and therefore international law might seem less relevant. It will be seen, however, that law enforcement measures raise important questions of international law that bear on the application and interpretation of domestic law. At this interface of domestic and international
law, a number of challenges arise for the sending State. The measures that
will be discussed concern criminal prosecution (Section II), freezing assets
(Section III), deprivation of nationality (Section IV) and revoking travel
documents (Section V).
This article will not deal with the use of military force or intelligence
operations. However, to the degree that intelligence operations provide
important information that may be used for the purpose of justifying a
number of the law enforcement measures, the linkage between the two will
be discussed in the context of the specific measures addressed.
As a preliminary matter before dealing with the specific measures, it is
important to define the term “foreign terrorist fighter” and to distinguish it
from a second term, “foreign fighter,” which is often used in international
discourse. No single authoritative definition exists for either, although foreign fighter is viewed as the more general of the two. A UN Human Rights
Council working group defined foreign fighter as “generally understood to
refer to individuals who leave their country of origin or habitual residence
and become involved in violence as part of an insurgency or non-State
armed group in an armed conflict. Foreign fighters are motivated by a
range of factors, notably ideology.”6
Resolution 2178 defines foreign terrorist fighters as “individuals who
travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the
purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation
in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including
6. Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating
Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination,
U.N. Doc. A/70/330, ¶ 13 (Aug. 19, 2015).
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in connection with armed conflict.”7 The definition of “terrorism” or “terrorist” is notoriously controversial and introduces a measure of definitional
uncertainty.8 Resolution 2178 does not include a definition of terrorism,9
appearing to leave it to the discretion of the member States. This aspect of
the resolution has led to sharp criticism from commentators who argue
that the lack of a definition increases the possibilities for abuse.10
In the Netherlands, at least in a domestic context, neither foreign fighter nor foreign terrorist fighter is used. The more frequently used terms are
“jihad-goer” or, more specifically, “Syria-goer.” Just as with foreign fighter
and foreign terrorist fighter, there is no single authoritative definition of
these terms. The internal security service of the Netherlands, the General
Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, or AIVD), defines a jihad-goer as “an individual who, with jihadist
intentions, leaves the Netherlands in an attempt to reach conflict areas
where jihadist groups are active.”11 On one hand, this definition is arguably
broader than foreign terrorist fighters as defined in Resolution 2178, because instead of referring specifically to terrorist acts or terrorist training, it
merely refers to jihadist intentions. On the other hand, because the term is
specifically linked to jihad rather than terrorism more broadly regardless of
motivation, it can be interpreted more narrowly than foreign terrorist fighters. Given that the issues to be examined deal specifically with individuals
in Syria, for practical purposes the difference in terminology does not appear significant, therefore, foreign terrorist fighter, the more widely used
term, will be used.
II.

CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

Criminal prosecution is an important tool in combating foreign terrorist
fighters. In recent years the Netherlands has been very active in pursuing
prosecution; indeed, the initiation of a criminal investigation when a foreign terrorist fighter is identified is the first measure referred to in the gov7. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 1, pmbl. ¶ 8.
8. See e.g., BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008).
9. It may be noted that the Council included a “working definition” or terrorism in
Resolution 1566. S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 3 (Oct. 8, 2004). Resolution 2178 does not expressly
refer to that resolution, however.
10. See e.g., Martin Scheinin, Back to Post 9-11 Panic? Security Council Resolution on Foreign
Terrorist Fighters, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/15407/po
st-911-panic-security-council-resolution-foreign-terrorist-fighters-scheinin/.
11. Parliamentary Papers II 2014–2015, 29754, No. 288, at 2 (unofficial translation).
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ernment’s action program.12 In March 2016 there were 115 ongoing investigations concerning approximately 135 persons related to violent jihadism.13 A limited number of cases have proceeded to trial so far,14 with
the first judgment on jihadism occurring in October 2013.15
Prosecution may take place either for common crimes such as murder,
manslaughter and arson, or for specific terrorism-related offenses. A number of such offenses were introduced into the Dutch Criminal Code
through the 2004 Terrorist Crimes Act,16 which was enacted in response to
the Council of Europe’s Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism of
June 13, 2002 (EU Framework Decision).17 It required, inter alia, European
Union (EU) members to define certain acts, as well as acts related to terrorist groups and terrorist-linked offenses, as crimes under their domestic legislation and to ensure the offenses were “punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties.”18
One of the elements introduced by the Terrorist Crimes Act was the
notion of “terrorist intent,” which was inserted in the Criminal Code as
Article 83a. Such intent is defined as “the intention of instilling profound
fear in (part of) a country’s population, unlawfully forcing a government to
do, refrain from doing or tolerate something, or seriously disrupting or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or international organisation.”19 Article 83(1) lists those
crimes which, if committed with terrorist intent, constitute a terrorist
crime.
In 2009, passage of the Act Concerning Training for Terrorism20 added
12. Parliamentary Papers II, 29754, No. 253, supra note 5, annex, at 5.
13. Parliamentary Papers 2015–2016, 29754, No. 363, at 2.
14. Parliamentary Papers 2015–2016, 29754, No. 326, annex, at 2.
15. Rechtbank Rotterdam [District Court of Rotterdam], No. 10/960233-12
(ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:8265), Oct. 23, 2013, http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inzien
document?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:8265.
16. Wet Terroristische Misdrijven, 24 juni 2004, Stb. 2004, 290 [hereinafter 2004
Terrorist Crimes Act]. This act inserted certain articles into the Wetboek van Strafrecht
[hereinafter Dutch Criminal Code].
17. Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 2002/475/JHA, 2002,
O.J. (L 164) 3 (EU) [hereinafter EU Council Framework Decision].
18. Id. art. 5.
19. 2004 Terrorist Crimes Act, supra note 16, at D.
20. Wet van 12 juni 2009 tot wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafrecht, Wetboek van
Strafvordering en enkele aanverwante wetten in verband met de strafbaarstelling van het
deelnemen en meewerken aan training voor terrorisme, uitbreiding van de mogelijkheden
tot ontzetting uit het beroep als bijkomende straf en enkele andere wijzigingen (Wet
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Article 134a to the Criminal Code. This constituted the domestic implementation of Article 7 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.21 In 2013, Article 421 criminalizing the financing of
terrorism was inserted into the Criminal Code.
A. The Relationship between Terrorist Offenses and International Humanitarian Law
One of the most interesting questions that has arisen in the case law based
on prosecutions for these offenses is the relationship between terrorist
crimes and international humanitarian law (IHL). In several cases the accused have argued that the application of IHL precluded their conviction
for terrorist offenses.
In the Maher H. case, for instance, an individual was prosecuted for
terrorist offenses committed while in Syria after his return to the Netherlands.22 He argued there was an ongoing non-international armed conflict
in Syria and that as a result the provisions in Dutch criminal law on terrorism were inapplicable. He alleged that if it could be proven that he participated in an armed conflict, he would benefit from the protections of the
Geneva Conventions, which meant that he could only be prosecuted for
war crimes.23 It appears the accused was claiming a form of combatant
Training voor Terrorisme), 18 juni 2009, Stb. 2009, 245 (Act Concerning Training for
Terrorism).
21. Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, May 16, 2005,
C.E.T.S. 196 [hereinafter Council Terrorist Convention]. It may be noted that while the
Convention defines training for terrorism only as providing instruction in certain fields (id.
art. 7), the 2004 Terrorist Crimes Act made receipt of training a criminal offense (2004
Terrorist Crimes Act, supra note 16, art. 1(G)). On October 22, 2015, an Additional Protocol to the Convention was adopted that also requires the criminalization of receiving terrorist training. Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, art. 3, Oct. 22, 2015, C.E.T.S. 197 [hereinafter Additional Protocol to
Council Terrorist Convention].
22. Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage [District Court of The Hague], No. 09/767116-14
(ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:14652), Dec. 1, 2014, http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inzien
document?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:14652 [hereinafter Maher H.].
23. Id. ¶ 3. For the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocol, see Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
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immunity.
Combatant immunity protects lawful combatants from punishment
under domestic law for committing lawful acts of war, i.e., acts not in violation of IHL.24 Although the term “combatant immunity” does not appear
in IHL instruments, it is a basic principle underpinning that body of law. It
is almost unanimously accepted, however, that combatant immunity only
applies in international armed conflicts, not in non-international armed
conflicts.25 This was the reasoning followed by the district court in rejecting
the accused’s claim.26 The court, after finding that there was a noninternational armed conflict in Syria, held that it followed from Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II27 and case law28 that
members of an organized armed group—in contrast to members of State
armed forces—are not authorized to use force in a non-international armed
conflict.29 According to the court, this was also the view of authoritative
commentators. It concluded that civilians who take a direct part in hostilities in a non-international armed conflict do not enjoy a status comparable
to combatant immunity; consequently, they can be criminally prosecuted
for their participation in hostilities.
The court went on to state that in a non-international armed conflict,
IHL is not the only applicable law, and in doing so referred to a 2014
judgment of the General Court of the European Union.30 The General
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
24. SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 514 (2012).
25. Id.; Waldemar Solf, The Status of Combatants in Non-international Armed Conflicts under
Domestic Law and Transnational Practice, 33 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 53, 57–59
(2011).
26. Maher H., supra note 22, ¶ 3.
27. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609.
28. Maher H., supra note 22, ¶ 3 (citing Case T-208/11 and T-508/11,16, LTTE v.
Council (Oct. 16, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&do
cid=158631&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=27
177 [hereinafter 2014 LTTE case]).
29. Id.
30. The General Court is one of the constituent parts of the Court of Justice of the
European Union. See Treaty on European Union, art. 19, Oct. 26, 2012, O.J. (C 326). The
General Court rules on actions for annulment brought by individuals, companies and, in
some cases, EU governments.
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Court dealt with a request by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
to annul regulations implementing EU legislation under which the LTTE
had been placed on a European sanctions list.31 The LTTE submitted that
the EU legislation concerned was not applicable to situations of armed
conflict, since those conflicts—and therefore the acts committed during
those conflicts—could only be governed by IHL.
According to the LTTE, it was
involved in armed conflict against the armed forces of the government of
Sri Lanka, seeking self-determination for the Tamil people and their “liberation from the oppression” of that government. Given the way in
which the LTTE’s armed forces were organized and their manner of
conducting operations, the members of those forces meet all the requirements laid down by international law for recognition of the members of those forces as “combatants.” That status gave them immunity in
respect of acts of war that were lawful under the terms of the law on
armed conflict and meant that, in the case of unlawful acts, the LTTE
would be subject only to that law, and not to any anti-terrorism legislation.32

This argument was rejected by the General Court. The Court held that
“contrary to what the LTTE claims, the applicability of international humanitarian law to a situation of armed conflict and to acts committed in
that context does not imply that legislation on terrorism does not apply to
those acts.”33
The district court in the Maher H. case followed a similar line of reasoning in reaching its conclusion. The judgment held that the fact that violations of IHL in non-international armed conflicts have been criminalized
as war crimes under Dutch criminal law, does not preclude these acts from
also being punishable as common crimes, nor does it mean that other acts
committed in the context of a non-international armed conflict cannot be
punishable under common criminal law.
This may seem an obvious conclusion; however, in an earlier case a
variation of the argument put forward by the accused had been successful.34 That case concerned individuals accused of collecting funds for the
31. 2014 LTTE case, supra note 28.
32. Id. ¶¶ 42–43.
33. Id. ¶ 56. For the reasoning of the Court on this point, see ¶¶ 54–83.
34. Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage [District Court of The Hague], No. 09/748801-09
(ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BT8829), Oct. 21, 2011, http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inzien
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LTTE. They were prosecuted for, inter alia, the crime of participation in the
activities of an organization whose objective was the commission of terrorist offenses. As with the crimes in the Maher H. case, the charge was based
on the EU Framework Decision.35
In reaching its decision, the court addressed the question of whether
the LTTE was an armed force within the meaning of the Framework Decision. Paragraph 11 of that decision provides:
Actions by armed forces during periods of armed conflict, which are governed by international humanitarian law within the meaning of these
terms under that law, and, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules
of international law, actions by the armed forces of a State in the exercise
of their official duties are not governed by this Framework Decision.36

This paragraph reflects wording similar to that found in a number of terrorism conventions. For example, Article 19(2) of the Terrorist Bombings
Convention provides:
The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms
are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed
by that law, are not governed by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are
not governed by this Convention.37

Article 6(2) of the Beijing Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts relating to International Civil Aviation38 contains identical wording, as
does Article 4(2) of the International Convention for the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism39 and Article 26(5) of the Council of Europe
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.40
The district court found the forces of the LTTE were comparable to
document?id=ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BT8829 [hereinafter 2011 LTTE case].
35. EU Council Framework Decision, supra note 17, art. 2(b).
36. Id. pmbl. ¶ 11.
37. International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings art. 19(2),
Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S 256.
38. Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts relating to International Civil
Aviation art. 6(2), Sept. 10, 2010, 974 U.N.T.S. 178.
39. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism art.
4(2), Apr. 13, 2005, 2445 U.N.T.S. 89.
40. Council Terrorist Convention, supra note 21, art. 26(5).
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State armed forces, and that there was a non-international armed conflict
between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka.41 It determined that
since all the acts of the accused referred to by the prosecution were connected to the armed conflict, it could not convict the accused of participating in an organization whose purpose was the commission of terrorist offenses. The court implied that since the acts concerned were in its view
outside the scope of the Framework Decision, they were also outside of
the scope of the offense found in the legislation implemented into Dutch
domestic criminal law.
On appeal, the district court’s findings on this issue were reversed.42
The court of appeal held that the LTTE was an organized armed group
engaged in an armed conflict,43 and then addressed the question of whether
Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I was applicable.44 It concluded the situation failed to meet the criteria of Article 1(4), but that there was, instead, a
non-international armed conflict between the LTTE and Sri Lanka.45 Finally, the court held that members of an organized armed group in a noninternational armed conflict do not enjoy combatant status, characterizing
them as “unprivileged belligerents” who could be prosecuted under domestic criminal law for their actions during the conflict.46
The court of appeal’s reasoning was followed by the district court of
The Hague in its judgment of December 10, 2015 in the so-called “Context” case.47 This case concerned nine accused who were charged with belonging to a group recruiting individuals to fight for the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and Jahbat Al-Nusra in Syria. One of the arguments put forward by the defense was that there was an international
armed conflict in Syria and Iraq, or at least some areas of those States.48
The defense claimed that many States supported insurgent groups, and that
there was strong evidence indicating such assistance went beyond mere fi41. 2011 LTTE case, supra note 34,
42. Gerechtshof Den Haag [Court of Appeal of The Hague], No. 22-005123-11
(ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:1082), Apr. 30, 2015, http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inzien
document?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:1082.
43. Id. § 10.4.1.
44. Id. § 10.4.3.
45. Id. § 10.4.2.3.4.
46. Id. § 10.4.3.3.2.
47. Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage [District Court of The Hague] (ECLI:NL:RBDHA:201
5:14365), Dec. 10, 2015, http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL
:RBDHA:2015:14365 [hereinafter Context case].
48. Id. ¶ 7.4.
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nancial or logistic support. It alleged that, in fact, some States exercised
“overall control” over certain groups, thus internationalizing the conflict.49
Because combatants in an international armed conflict enjoy combatant
immunity the defense considered that the Netherlands did not have jurisdiction over the alleged facts.50
The court held that the armed conflict in Syria was a non-international
armed conflict, finding insufficient evidence to conclude that the conflict
had been internationalized.51 The court then stated that in a noninternational armed conflict, the application of IHL does not exclude the
application of other fields of law; a finding it indicated is supported in
abundant case law and literature.52 According to the court, it followed that
acts of violence committed during a non-international armed conflict can
be crimes under both IHL and domestic law.53
The court went on to find that in non-international armed conflicts
members of armed groups have no combatant status. In reaching this conclusion it reviewed the drafting history of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
which indicated States were unwilling to grant combatant immunity to
members of organized armed groups with which they were in conflict, because of their desire to prevent citizens taking justice in their own hands.54
Thus, it held that members of organized armed groups are criminally responsible both for common crimes such as murder and violations of
IHL.55
The defense raised the issue of the meaning to be given to the provision excluding armed forces from the Framework Decision; specifically,
whether paragraph 11 precludes the application of the terrorist offenses in
Dutch criminal law to conduct occurring during armed conflicts.56 The
court held that it needed to establish the meaning of armed forces as used
in the Framework Decision to answer this question.57 It considered that the
term clearly encompasses the armed forces of a State, but that non-State
armed groups are usually referred to as “organized armed groups,” rather
49. Id. ¶ 7.4.
50. Id. ¶ 7.20.
51. Id. ¶¶ 7.5–7.13.
52. Id. ¶ 7.17.
53. Id. ¶ 7.18.
54. Id. ¶ 7.23.
55. Id. ¶¶ 7.22–7.23.
56. Id. ¶ 7.34.
57. Id. ¶ 7.37.
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than “armed forces.”58 The court then looked at the government’s interpretation, observing that although paragraph 11 had not been addressed in
discussions between the government and parliament as the Framework
Decision was being implemented, a comparable provision—Article 19(2)
of the Terrorist Bombing Convention—was discussed. In that debate, the
Minister of Justice defined armed forces as the “armed forces of a State,”
but did acknowledge that different interpretations were inevitable.59
The court also considered that in interpreting paragraph 11, the object
and purpose of IHL and of the paragraph needed to be taken into account.60 It noted that the Framework Decision was one of a number of instruments adopted by the international community in response to the global threat of terrorist groups61 and that the purpose of these instruments—
the prosecution of suspected terrorists before domestic courts on the basis
of domestic terrorism legislation—was of great importance. It found that
interpreting the exclusion clause in a way that would make it impossible to
prosecute suspected terrorists for their terrorist acts because these were
committed during an armed conflict, would be unreasonable.62
The court ultimately reached two important conclusions. First, that it
was clear that the term “armed forces” as it appears in the Framework Decision encompassed only the armed forces of a State. Second, that members of organized armed groups do not enjoy combatant status and can be
prosecuted under both IHL and domestic law.63 Thus it did not consider
that any conflict existed between the two regimes.
The attempts by the Dutch courts to clarify the relationship between
IHL and counterterrorism instruments, and the meaning of exclusion
clauses in the latter, are a welcome development in addressing issues that
have created confusion. As the Minister of Justice stated, the exclusion
clauses in counterterrorism instruments are formulated in a way that leaves
room for interpretation.64
This ambiguity has led to divergent opinions, particularly in how the
term “armed forces” is interpreted. There is some support for the view that
58. Id. ¶ 7.40.
59. Id.
60. Id. ¶ 7.41.
61. Id. ¶ 7.42.
62. Id.
63. Id. ¶ 7.44.
64. See, e.g., Claudia Martin, Terrorism as a Crime in International and Domestic Law: Open
issues, in COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 639, 643–51 (Larissa van den Herik & Nico Schrijver eds., 2013).
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organized armed groups fall under the category of the armed forces.65 This
interpretation could contribute to achieving certain policy objectives. First,
it could provide an incentive for members of armed groups to respect IHL,
as long as the exclusion of members of organized armed groups from the
scope of application of counterterrorism conventions is limited to acts that
are not prohibited under IHL. Second, each of the counterterrorism conventions typically requires a State to either prosecute or extradite individuals who commit an offense within the meaning of the convention. By including members of armed groups in the exclusion clause, third States
would have discretion in deciding whether or not to prosecute them for
acts committed during an armed conflict, insofar as they do not amount to
international crimes, and would not be required to grant extradition requests. Some believe this would be consistent with the recommendation
found in Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II to “endeavour to grant the
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed
conflict.”66
Notwithstanding these possible advantages for including organized
armed groups within the definition of armed forces, the majority view is
that armed forces in the exclusion clauses of counterterrorism instruments
refers exclusively to State armed forces.67 This interpretation is certainly the
one most consistent with IHL and its classification of the legal status of
members of organized armed groups. As the discussion by the Dutch
courts demonstrates, the interpretation of exclusion clauses in counterterrorism instruments is closely related to the status of members of organized
armed groups in non-international armed conflicts. It is widely accepted
65. See, e.g., Andrea Gioia, The UN Conventions on the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 3, at
18 (Giuseppe Nesi ed., 2006); Daniel O’Donnell, International Treaties against Terrorism and
the Use of Terrorism during Armed Conflict and by Armed Forces, 88 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
OF THE RED CROSS 853, 869 (2006). See also the position taken by the Norwegian government in relation to the exclusion clause in the Terrorist Bombings Convention, ERLING JOHANNES HUSABØ & INGVILD BRUCE, FIGHTING TERRORISM MULTILEVEL CRIMINAL LEGISLATION: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1373, THE EU FRAMEWORK DECISION ON COMBATING TERRORISM AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION IN NORDIC, DUTCH
AND GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW 401–2 (2009).
66. See, e.g., HUSABØ & BRUCE, supra note 65, at 383.
67. Id. at 384; Rikke Ishøy, Humanity and the Discourse of Legality, in SEARCHING FOR A
“PRINCIPLE OF HUMANITY” IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 304, 315 (Kjetil
Mujezinovic Larsen, Camilla Guldahl Cooper & Gro Nystuen eds., 2013) (discussing the
European Framework Decision).
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that IHL does not grant combatant immunity to members of organized
armed groups, except in those rare cases in which AP I, Article 1(4) applies.68 This was correctly concluded by the Dutch courts, but this is not to
say that there is no debate on this issue.69
B. Incitement and the Freedom of Expression
Incitement to commit terrorist offenses has played an increasingly important role in the criminal prosecution of foreign terrorist fighters in the
Netherlands.70 Incitement is criminalized in Article 131 of the Criminal
Code; Article 132 criminalizes the distribution of inciting texts or images.
Both articles increase the maximum penalty if the offense that is incited is a
terrorist offense. Under Dutch criminal law, for incitement to be proven a
direct connection is required between the incitement and the criminal offense that is the object of the incitement.71 Incitement can take place directly or indirectly, but must be done publicly. Dutch courts have found that
the Internet is a public place, provided the general public has access to the
Internet page concerned.72 Case law has made clear that incitement can take
the form of a request or urging, but can also be an expression of high moral appreciation for an act.73
Prosecution for incitement raises the question of the relationship be68. SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 24, at 514.
69. In recent years there have been a number of voices that have called for introducing a qualified combatant immunity for members of organized armed groups under IHL
See e.g., EMILY CRAWFORD, THE TREATMENT OF COMBATANTS AND INSURGENTS UNDER
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2010); Geoffrey Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable: Has the
Time Come to Offer Combatant Immunity to Non-State Actors?, 22 STANFORD LAW & POLICY
REVIEW 253 (2011).
70. For a general discussion of incitement to terrorism see Yael Ronen, Incitement to
Terrorist Acts under International Law, 23 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 654
(2010).
71. On incitement in Dutch criminal law, see generally Jeroen ten Voorde, Artikel
131–132, in STRAFRECHT: TEKST & COMMENTAAR 965–70 (Tineke Cleiren, Jan Crijns &
Rino Verpalen eds., 2014).
72. See, e.g., Gerechtshof Amsterdam [Court of Appeal of Amsterdam], (ECLI:NL:
GHAMS:2009:BK4139), Nov. 23, 2009, http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument
?id=ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BK4139; Hoge Raad [Supreme Court] (ECLI:NL:HR:
2009:BJ7237), Dec. 15, 2009, http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:
NL:HR:2009:BJ7237.
73. ALFRED JANSSEN & AERNOUT NIEUWENHUIS, UITINGSDELICTEN ¶ 4.2.2.3.2
(2008).
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tween this offense on the one hand and the freedom of expression on the
other hand. The latter is enshrined in Article 6 of the Constitution of the
Netherlands.74 It is also set out in Article 10 of the European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others,
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.75

It follows from Article 10(2) that restrictions on the freedom of expression
are permissible only if three criteria are met. First, the interference must be
prescribed by law. Second, it must be aimed at one or more of the listed
interests or values. Finally, the interference must be necessary in a democratic society. The adjective necessary within the meaning of Article 10(2)
implies the existence of a “pressing social need.”76 In determining whether
there is a pressing social need, a national court must decide whether the
interference was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and whether
the reasons cited by national authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient.77 The aims referred to are the particular interests or values from the
exhaustive list in Article 10(2) that are invoked by the government to justify
its interference.
The relationship between freedom of expression and incitement was
74. GW. [Constitution] art. 6, sub. 1 (“Everyone shall have the right to profess freely
his religion or belief, either individually or in community with others, without prejudice to
his responsibility under the law.”).
75. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
76. Zana v. Turkey, Application No. 18954/91, Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 51 (1997).
77. Id.
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considered by the district court of The Hague in the case of Maher H.78 In
this case, the accused had, inter alia, distributed jihadist You Tube videos
through Whatsapp, and posted a picture of himself with a Kalashnikov and
photos of ISIL flags on his Facebook page. The defense argued, inter alia,
that these expressions did not go beyond what was allowed under the freedom of expression provided by Article 10(1).79 In rejecting this argument,
the court invoked ECHR, Article 17,80 which provides that
[n]othing in th[e] Convention may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth
[in the Convention] or at their limitation to a greater extent than provided
for in the Convention.

On this basis, the court considered that the freedom of expression does
not offer a safe haven for those who incite to terrorist offences.81
Incitement was also charged in the Context case.82 Six of the accused
were charged with incitement to commit terrorist offenses, specifically to
take part in armed jihad in Syria. The accused used a wide variety of media,
including a website, a digital radio channel, YouTube, Twitter and Facebook, and public demonstrations. The court applied the ECHR Article
10(2) criteria finding that the criminalization of incitement was prescribed
by law and that its purpose was to prevent the commission of criminal offenses, and was, therefore, a legitimate infringement on the freedom of expression.
As to the question of whether the interference with the freedom of expression was necessary in a democratic society, the judgment contains an
extensive discussion of the acts charged as incitement in which the court
took into account the content of the media and public statements, the context in which they were made, the places or occasions they occurred, the
audience and their apparent objective.83 Although an in depth analysis of
this discussion is beyond the ambit of this article, it is interesting to note
that the court held that the direct connection between a number of the
statements and rousing others to participate in armed jihad in Syria was
78. Maher H., supra note 22.
79. Id. ¶ 4.7.
80. Id. ¶ 4.8.2.
81. Id.
82. Context case, supra note 47.
83. Id. ¶ 11.16.
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lacking. This was the case, inter alia, for the mere display of flags used by
ISIS,84 and also for two lectures concerning historic texts by Anwar AlAwlaki. The latter were broadcast on a radio channel and made no reference to the contemporary situation in Syria.85
This was not the case, however, for a broadcast lecture by one of the
accused in which he, inter alia, begged for victory by ISIS and Al-Nusra,
and condemned foreign terrorist fighters who had returned from Syria after
only several weeks.86 Taking into account the nature of the lecture, the radio channel on which it was broadcast and the audience, as well as the context in which it was delivered, the court considered that the apparent intention was to imprint on listeners that traveling to Syria to take part in armed
jihad was desirable.87
The court held that a number of the statements could be regarded as
glorification of, or propaganda for, armed violence, but not as incitement.88
The court noted that the former is not a criminal offence in the Netherlands and that propaganda in principle does not fall within the definition of
incitement.89 The accused were therefore acquitted of incitement with respect to these statements.90
Of particular interest are the remarks by the court concerning the fleeting nature of messages on social media such as Twitter and Facebook. The
defense of some of the accused stressed this character of social media. It
argued that messages placed on Twitter or Facebook could not easily be
regarded as indirect incitement, because the context surrounding them is
lacking. The messages are usually short, often accompanied by a picture or
hyperlink, un-nuanced and lack analysis. Further, it was argued, the messages are consumed quickly, often after superficial reading.
In addressing the defense’s arguments, the court considered that while
these characteristics may, on the one hand, reduce the impact left by the
message, on the other hand, it places a larger responsibility on the sender.
This is because the first message seen is the one that will be remembered.91
In other words, the court does not appear to have considered the fleeting
84. Id. ¶¶ 12.5–12.11.
85. Id. ¶ 12.35.
86. Id. ¶ 12.37.
87. Id. ¶ 12.38.
88. See, e.g., id. ¶ 12.41.
89 Id. ¶ 11.17.
90. Id. ¶¶ 12.41, 12.60, 12.73, 12.138 and 12.141.
91. Id. ¶ 11.21.
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nature of social media as a reason to be more lenient in determining
whether incitement has occurred. The court maintained that there is a responsibility on the part of the sender to consider what his/her message will
convey when read superficially. It took this responsibility into account in its
analysis of specific statements.92 All six of the accused were convicted of
incitement; for one it was the only offense for which he was convicted.93
He was given a prison sentence of seven days.
C. Terrorist Intent
As indicated above, the Dutch Criminal Code provides that certain crimes,
if committed with terrorist intent, constitute a terrorist crime, with a resultant increase in the maximum penalty for these crimes. Article 83a of the
Criminal Code defines terrorist intent as “the intention of instilling profound fear in (part of) a country’s population, unlawfully forcing a government to do, refrain from doing or tolerate something, or seriously disrupting or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or
social structures of a country or international organisation.”94 This definition is based on the EU Framework Decision.95
The interpretation of terrorist intent was at issue in two cases decided
by the district court of Gelderland in February 2015.96 The cases concerned
two men who were arrested in Germany in rental cars with large sums of
money and bags filled with, inter alia, combat gear, balaclavas, combat goggles and iPhones. There were indications that the brother of one of them
was fighting in Syria. Among the offenses charged was conspiracy to commit murder, aggravated assault and arson, all with terrorist intent. This required the court to analyze what constitutes terrorist intent. It held that the
necessary intent cannot be deduced solely from the ideology of an accused
and that to find terrorist intent there must be objective evidence of its
presence. However, in determining whether such evidence existed, the
92. See e.g., id. ¶ 12.74 (discussing certain Facebook messages).
93. Id. ¶ 22.46 (Imane B.).
94. Dutch Criminal Code, supra note 16, art. 83a (unofficial translation).
95. EU Council Framework Decision, supra note 17, art. 1(1).
96. Rechtbank Gelderland [District Court of Gelderland], No. 05/862117-13 (ECLI:
NL:RBGEL:2015:757), Feb. 9, 2015, http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id
=ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2015:757 [hereinafter Hakim B.]; Rechtbank Gelderland [District
Court of Gelderland], No. 05/862092-13 (ECLI:NL:RBGELD:2015:756), Feb. 9, 2015,
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2015:756 [herinafter Mohamed el A.].
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thoughts and ideology of the accused could be taken into account.97 In the
case at hand because it was unclear whether the accused intended to travel
to Syria and if so, for what purpose, neither the alleged acts nor terrorist
intent could be proven.98
Another case in which terrorist intent was at issue was decided by the
district court of Rotterdam in June 2015.99 This case concerned a returned
foreign terrorist fighter who was planning a robbery to generate funds for
jihad. The court concluded relatively easily that there was terrorist intent as
the proceeds of the robbery were to go to jihadist groups known to commit large-scale human rights abuses in Syria. This, according to the court,
was sufficient evidence for a finding of terrorist intent.
The courts thus have made a distinction between terrorist intent and
ideological motive, but have held that motive can nevertheless play a role in
establishing terrorist intent. This will ease the prosecution’s burden in establishing intent in cases where the accused is an adherent of an ideology
that encourages violence.100
III.

ASSET FREEZES

Another instrument that the Netherlands employs to combat foreign terrorist fighters is that of sanctions. Sanctions include travel bans and asset
freezes. Travel bans are implemented via the non-issuance of a visa (to
non-national foreign terrorist fighters) and the revocation of passports (for
Dutch nationals).101 The section focuses on asset freezes.
The UN Security Council has imposed two asset freezes directly relevant to addressing the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters present in
Syria and Iraq. In Resolution 1373, the Council imposed an asset freeze on
persons and entities involved in committing or facilitating terrorism.102 In
97. Hakim B., supra note 96, § 3.3.2; Mohamed el A., supra note 96, § 3.3.2.
98. Hakim B., supra note 96, § 3.4; Mohamed el A., supra note 96, § 3.5.
99. Rechtbank Rotterdam [District Court of Rotterdam], No. 10/960233-13 (ECLI:
NL:RBROT:2015:3957), June 8, 2015, http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument
?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:3957.
100. Marlous van Noorloos, De Strafrechtelijke Aanpak van Terrorisme en Syriegangers vanaf
2014, DELIK EN DELINKWENT 56 (2015).
101. See infra Section V on the revocation of travel documents.
102. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1(c) (Sept. 28, 2001) (“States shall freeze without delay funds
and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to
commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of
entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and
222

Foreign Fighters

Vol. 92

Resolution 1267 and subsequent resolutions, particularly Resolution 1989,
it imposed an asset freeze specifically on Al-Qaida and other individuals,
groups, undertakings and entities associated with it.103 In Resolution 2253,
the Council restated that asset freezes imposed in earlier resolutions apply
to ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities.104 In the case of the Netherlands, these regimes have been implemented through EU regulation. The general regime based on Resolution
1373 has been implemented through Common Positions
2001/930/CFSP105 and 2001/931/CFSP,106 together with Regulation
2580/2001107 and subsequent regulations.108 The Al-Qaida asset freeze has
been implemented through EU Regulation 881/2002.109 Based on this legislation the EU maintains lists of persons and entities to which the asset
freezes apply.110
In the case of the asset freeze based on Resolution 1373, States list persons and entities to which the freeze applies on a national basis, in addition
to the list maintained by the EU. The legal basis under national law in the
Netherlands for doing so is the Sanctions Law of 1977, which authorizes
the Minister of Foreign Affairs to promulgate ministerial regulations to implement international obligations.111 Issued under this authority, Sanctions
Regulation Terrorism 2007-II gives the Minister the authority to freeze the
assets of any person or organization which, he, with the agreement of the
Minister of Security and Justice and the Minister of Finance, determines
fulfills the criteria set forth in Resolution 1373.112 Imposing such an asset
entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including
funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
such persons and associated persons and entities.”).
103. S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1989, ¶ 1(a) (June 17, 2011).
104. S.C. Res. 2253, ¶ 2(a) (Dec, 17, 2015).
105. Council Common Position (EC) No. 2001/930/CFSP of 27 December 2001,
2001 O.J. (L 344) 90.
106. Council Common Position (EC) No. 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001,
2001 O.J. (L 344) 93.
107. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001, O.J. (L 344) 70.
108. Including Commission Regulation (EC) No. 745/2003 of 28 April 2003, O.J.
(L106) 22; Council Regulation (EC) No. 1791/2006 of 1 January 2007, O.J. (L363) 1.
109. Council Regulation (EC) No. 881/2001 of 27 May 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 139) 9.
110. European Union, Consolidated List of Persons, Groups and Entities Subject to
EU Financial Sanctions, http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/consol-list/index_en.htm
(last visited Apr. 17, 2016).
111. Sanctiewet 1977 van 15 februari 1980, Stb. 1980, 93.
112. Sanctieregeling Terrorisme 2007-II, art. 2 Stcrt. 2007, 248.
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freeze is done by means of an administrative decision (aanwijzingsbesluit)
that, in addition to freezing the assets of the person or organization, prohibits others from conducting financial services for, or in the interest of, or
providing assets to such a person or organization.113
Between 2002 and January 2016, sixty-four asset freezes had been imposed on fifty-six individuals and on seven organizations (one organization
twice) as a consequence of this Regulation.114 When considering whether an
individual or organization should be added to the listing, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs will convene a so-called “asset freeze meeting” (bevriezingsoverleg), bringing together representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Security and Justice, the Public Prosecution Service and the AIVD. Circumstances that may result in a
listing include the initiation of a criminal investigation; prosecution for
commission of, attempted commission of, complicity in or facilitation of a
terrorist act; and conviction of such crime. Additionally, a listing may be
initiated on the basis of an AIVD official report providing credible information of involvement of a person or organization in a terrorist act, attempted commission of such an act or complicity in, or facilitation of, such
an act. In instances where a listing is being considered on the basis of an
AIVD official report or an investigation or prosecution by the public prosecutor, the information underlying the report, investigation or prosecution
must be examined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to determine
whether it provides sufficient support for a listing. The decision to list a
person or organization is ultimately made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance and the Minister of
Security and Justice. It is then published in the government gazette (Staatscourant), and communicated in writing to the person or organization concerned, including the grounds for the listing in so far as practically possible.
An administrative objection to the decision may be submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, if unsuccessful, it may be appealed to the administrative courts.
Assets freezes related to Syria have not been judicially challenged to
date. Challenges to other listings, however, provide insight into the standards courts would apply. Particularly illustrative is an April 2015 judgment

113. Id., art. 2(2)–2(4).
114. The Netherlands, National Terrorism List, Dec. 31, 2015, https://www.rijks
overheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2015/08/27/nationale-terrorismelijst (last visited
Mar. 21, 2016).
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by the district court of Amsterdam.115 This case concerned the listing of
three persons under Sanctions Regulation Terrorism 2007-II. They had
been extradited to Belgium and convicted there for recruiting persons and
raising funds for jihad in Chechnya.116 Asset freezes were subsequently imposed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the basis of their conviction in
Belgium.117 After their administrative objection was rejected by the minister, they appealed the decision to the administrative chamber of the district
court of Amsterdam. They argued, inter alia, that there was insufficient information to support the listing, which was based solely on the Belgian
judgment (which in the meantime had been overturned by the Belgian
Court of Cassation on procedural grounds).118
In reaching its decision, the court indicated that an asset freeze has serious consequences for the person being listed. For this reason, it held the
minister in considering a listing has a far-reaching, proactive responsibility
to obtain the information on which to base a decision, and the results of
that information-gathering exercise must be described with sufficient clarity
in the decision to list. The court found that the mere reference to the Belgian judgment did not meet this standard and revoked the listing.
This judgment illustrates that the factual information underlying a listing must meet certain minimum standards. These standards may be difficult to meet. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is largely dependent on the
intelligence services and the Public Prosecution Service to gather information. The former may be reluctant to provide information out of concern that it will become public. Moreover, even if the intelligence service or
Public Prosecution Service is willing to obtain the necessary information,
doing so may be difficult, particularly if the person concerned is in Syria.
Another challenge posed by listings is how to reconcile them with the
goal of deradicalizing foreign terrorist fighters and reintegrating them into
society. These are important objectives of counterterrorism efforts and
freezing assets may be counterproductive to achieving these objectives in

115. Rechtbank Amsterdam [District Court of Amsterdam], No. AMS 14/6356, 6312,
6303 (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2015:2350), Apr. 24, 2015, http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/in
ziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2015:2350 [hereinafter Asset Freeze case].
116. Maarten van Dun, Amsterdammers Veroordeeld in Belgische Terreurzaak, HET PAROOL
(Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.parool.nl/amsterdam/amsterdammers-veroordeeld-in-belgisc
he-terreurzaak~a3573850/.
117. Staatscourant jaargang 2014, nr. 4430, 4431, 4433, Feb. 14, 2014.
118. Asset Freeze case, supra note 115.
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certain circumstances.119
IV.

DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY

The Dutch government has identified revoking the nationality of persons
who travel from the Netherlands and join an armed terrorist group as a
priority in combating the foreign terrorist phenomenon.120
Existing rules on revoking nationality are set out in the Law on Dutch
Nationality.121 This law provides a number of grounds for revoking nationality, some are mandatory and others lie within the discretionary powers of
the Minister of Security and Justice. An important exception precludes revocation if this would lead to statelessness. 122 This is a consequence of the
obligations of the Netherlands as a party to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.123 This Convention prohibits a State party from depriving a person of his or her nationality if such deprivation would render
him stateless.124 It provides for a limited number of exceptions to this rule,
including where a person has “conducted himself in a manner seriously
prejudicial to the vital interests of the State.”125 In order to be able to avail
itself of this exception, the State concerned must at the time of signature,
ratification or accession specify its retention of the right to revoke nationality in such instances.126 The Netherlands did not make such a declaration.
To address jihadism, the government introduced two bills that would
broaden the grounds for revoking nationality. The first, which was adopted
by parliament on March 1, 2016, revises the nationality legislation to permit
revoking citizenship in the case of terrorist offenses.127 The explanatory
memorandum accompanying the bill notes that the travel of young persons
119. See e.g., DAAN WEGGEMANS & BEATRICE DE GRAAF, NA DE VRIJLATING
(2015).
120. Parliamentary Papers II, No. 253, supra note 5, at 5.
121. Rijkswet van 19 december 1984, houdende vaststelling van nieuwe, algemene
bepalingen omtrent het Nederlanderschap ter vervanging van de Wet van 12 december
1892, Stb. 268 op het Nederlanderschap en het ingezetenschap (Rijkswet op het
Nederlanderschap), 19 december 1984, Stb. 1984, 628.
122. Id., art. 14(6).
123. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175.
124. Id., art. 8(1).
125. Id., art. 8(3)(ii).
126. Id., art. 8(3).
127. Parliamentary Papers 2013–2014, 34016 (R2036), No. 2 (Sept. 9, 2014)
(Wetsvoorstel tot wijziging van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap ter verruiming van
de mogelijkheden voor intrekking van het Nederlanderschap bij terroristische misdrijven).
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to Syria for the purpose of terrorist training is particularly topical for the
Netherlands.128 The bill permits the Minister of Security and Justice to revoke nationality on the basis of a final conviction for the crime of “providing oneself or another the opportunity, means or information or attempting to do so for the commission of a terrorist offense or an offense in the
preparation for or facilitation of a terrorist offense, or acquiring knowledge
or skills to that effect for oneself or another.”129 This criminal offense was
inserted in the Criminal Code in 2010.
In 2013, parliament adopted a motion calling on the government to
make conviction for this crime a ground for automatic revocation of nationality.130 The bill, however, does not provide for automatic revocation.
Instead, it makes the act a discretionary decision of the Minister of Security
and Justice. The bill does not change the existing prohibition on the revocation of Dutch citizenship if such an action would result in the individual
becoming stateless.
The bill has raised a number of questions among commentators. One is
whether it conforms to the treaties on revocation of nationality to which
the Netherlands is party. In addition to the Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness, the Netherlands is a party to the European Convention on
Nationality,131 which provides a list of possible grounds for revoking nationality. One of these, engaging in conduct seriously prejudicial to the
State’s vital interests,132 has been invoked by the government as applicable
in cases provided for in the bill. According to the government, a conviction
under Article 134a of the Criminal Code will always meet this criterion.133
Commentators, however, question whether a blanket decision is appropriate and suggest that revocation of nationality should be determined on a
case-by-case basis.134
A second bill provides for inclusion in the Law on Nationality the authority to revoke a person’s nationality “in the interest of national security.”135 This bill was submitted to parliament in December 2015.136 It would
128. Parliamentary Papers 2013–2014, 34016 (R2036), No. 3 (Sept. 9, 2014), at 2.
129. Dutch Criminal Code, supra note 16, art. 134a (unofficial translation).
130. Motie Dijkhoff c.s., Parliamentary Papers II 2012–2013, 29754, No. 224 (May
28, 2013).
131. European Convention on Nationality, Nov. 6, 1997, E.T.S. 166.
132. Id., art. 7(1)(c).
133. Parliamentary Papers II 2015–2016, 34016 (R2036), C, at 9.
134. See, e.g., Gerard-René de Groot & Olivier Vonk, Terrorisme en het Verlies van
Nederlanderschap, 4 ASIEL & MIGRANTENRECHT 397 (2013).
135. Parliamentary Papers II 2015–2016, 34356 (R2064), No. 2, Dec. 4, 2015.
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allow the Minister of Security and Justice to revoke the nationality of a person located outside the Netherlands who has joined an organization involved in an international or non-international armed conflict when that
organization is listed as a threat to national security by the Minister of Security and Justice.137
The bill was drafted with the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters
in Syria very much in mind. The explanatory memorandum to the bill outlines the threat posed by violent jihadists to national security. It refers, inter
alia, to the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria as a destabilizing factor both regionally and internationally.138 It is specifically aimed at preventing the return of violent jihadists to the Netherlands from abroad. To achieve this,
revocation of nationality is a first step, followed by the designation of the
person concerned as an undesirable alien.139
One interesting feature of the proposal is the establishment of a list of
organizations that threaten the national security of the Netherlands. The
explanatory memorandum states that the list will be based on a selection of
organizations placed on international terrorism lists created by the UN or
EU.140 Not all of the organizations on these international lists will be included, however, because not all of them pose a threat to the national security of the Netherlands. The explanatory memorandum also makes clear
that the facts showing that a person has joined a terrorist organization must
be established by the minister.141 A number of sources can be used for this
purpose, including information provided by intelligence agencies and information provided by the Public Prosecution Service. In some cases information may also be publicly available, e.g., on the Internet.
This bill has received a number of critical questions from commenta-

136. Id.
137. Id. Before doing so, the Minister requires prior approval of the Council of Ministers.
138. Parliamentary Papers II 2015–2016, 34356 (R2064), No. 3, Dec. 4, 2015, at 2.
139. The Aliens Act (Wet van 23 november 2000 tot algehele herziening van de
Vreemdelingenwet, Stb. 2000, 495 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000)) provides the possibility for
the responsible Minister to declare someone an undesirable alien. The consequence of
such a declaration is that the person concerned must leave the Netherlands. Article 197 of
the Criminal Code makes the presence of a person who has been declared an undesirably
alien a criminal offence.
140. Parliamentary Papers II, 2015–2016, 34356, No. 3, supra note 138, at 5.
141. Id. at 6.
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tors and civil society organizations.142 One, which is similar to that raised
with regard to the first bill, is whether joining a terrorist organization necessarily constitutes conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the
State in the sense of the European Convention on Nationality. A closely
related question is whether the act of joining is in and of itself sufficient to
conclude that the individual is a threat to the Netherland’s national security, and therefore, whether revocation of nationality is a proportionate
measure. Commentators have suggested an additional criterion to the act of
joining a terrorist organization, i.e., that the person concerned must be personally involved in the commission of violent acts.143
Other questions concern the possibility to appeal decisions to revoke
nationality, and whether sufficient legal protection is provided. The bill creates the right to appeal to the district court when notified that the government intends to revoke nationality. A decision by the district court can then
be appealed to the administrative jurisdiction division of the Council of
State, the highest administrative court of the Netherlands. One question
raised in relation to this appeals procedure is how the person concerned
will become aware of the government’s intention to revoke his nationality.
If the person is unaware that the revocation proceedings have been initiated, he cannot effectively challenge them. In such a case, the bill provides
for proprio motu review by the administrative court. The question is whether
this meets the requirement of Article 13, ECHR that “[e]veryone whose
rights and freedoms . . . are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority.”
Other concerns are related to legal representation. The bill does not
explicitly provide for legal representation of a person whose nationality is
revoked. There is some debate about whether in order to safeguard adequate legal protection, it is necessary to appoint legal counsel.144 A closely
related question is whether, if legal counsel is assigned, he or she will be
able to operate effectively without being in contact with the person concerned.
142. See, e.g., Nederlands Juristen Comité voor de Mensenrechten (NJCM), Advies
NJCM inzake wijziging van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap in het belang van de
nationale veiligheid (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rap
porten/2015/12/01/ek-advies-njcm-inz-wijziging-van-de-rijkswet-op-hetnederlanderschap-in-het-belang-van-de-nationale-veiligheid.
143. See, e.g., Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, Advies intrekken
Nederlanderschap in belang nationale veiligheid (Feb. 16, 2015), http://acvz.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/16-02-2015_wetsadvies-IntrekkingBurgerschap.pdf.
144. Id. at 6.
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Finally, an interesting point is that the Minister of Security and Justice,
as a condition precedent to revoking a person’s nationality, must find that
that there is an ongoing armed conflict. Such determinations are often very
sensitive in terms of foreign policy with respect to other States. For this
reason States are generally reluctant to make such determinations. This may
not be an issue with regard to the situation in Syria and Iraq, but it may in
the case of conflicts involving other States.
V.

REVOKING TRAVEL DOCUMENTS

Revoking the nationality of foreign terrorist fighters limits their ability to
travel. The committee established by the UN Security Council to monitor
implementation of Resolution 1373 has underlined that “a very effective
way to prevent the creation of foreign terrorist fighters is to ensure that
those who attempt to travel to become foreign terrorist fighters are prevented from leaving their country of origin and/or residence to travel
abroad to conflict zones.”145 A way to achieve that result, which is less farreaching than revoking nationality, is to revoke travel documents, particularly passports.
In the Netherlands, a passport is normally issued by the mayor of a
person’s city or town of residence. Existing legislation allows the Minister
of Security and Justice to request the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations to “signal” a passport. This may be done in a number of circumstances. One of these is when there is a reasonable suspicion that the person involved will commit acts outside of the Netherlands that pose a threat
to the security and other vital interests of the Netherlands or of friendly
powers.146 Once a document is signaled, the issuing authority must revoke
the document. As of June 2015, seventy passports had been revoked
through this signaling process.
A person whose passport has been revoked can still obtain a national
identity card. Although in the Netherlands the national identity card is not
an official travel document,147 it can be used to travel to a number of coun145. Annex to Letter dated 13 May 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/338 (May 14,
2015), at 16.
146. Paspoortwet van 9 maart 2014, Stb. 2014, 19, art. 23 [hereinafter Law on Passports].
147. Id., art. 2.
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tries, including Turkey, the State that is most frequently used by foreign
terrorist fighters entering Syria from Europe. This is illustrated by the case
of a Dutch woman who was arrested in Turkey in April of 2015, apparently
intending to travel to Syria from there. Her passport had been revoked, but
she had applied for and obtained a national identity card, which she used to
travel to Turkey.148 To address this lacuna, the government has announced
its intention to introduce legislation that would automatically revoke both a
person’s passport and national identity card when a national travel ban has
been imposed on that person.149 This may raise questions concerning the
right to leave and return to one’s country, laid down in Article 12(2) and (4)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, respectively.150
At the regional level, these rights are guaranteed in Protocol 4 to the
ECHR.151
VI.

CONCLUSION

As was stated in the introduction, this article does not present a comprehensive overview of the measures taken by the Netherlands to address the
foreign terrorist fighters’ phenomenon. Given the number and wide range
of measures taken, such a review is beyond the scope of this article. Moreover, the legal and policy framework is constantly developing, so that any
exhaustive description would very quickly become incomplete. This article
has focused on law enforcement in the broad sense of the term. This
should not create the impression, however, that the approach by Netherlands is solely—or even primarily—a security-based approach. The U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights, among others, has warned against
such a one-sided approach, calling for stepped up measures to address the
148. Eindhovense Vrouw op Weg naar Syrie voor Tweede Keer Aangehouden, nu in Turkije,
EINDHOVENS DAGBLAD (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.ed.nl/regio/eindhoven/eindhovense
-vrouw-op-weg-naar-syri%C3%AB-voor-tweede-keer-aangehouden-nu-in-turkije-1.483
8666.
149. Press Release, NL Government, Wijziging Paspoortwet Maakt Vervallen
Paspoort en Identiteitskaart Jihadgangers Mogelijk, Sept. 4, 2015, https://www.rijksover
heid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2015/09/04/wijziging-paspoortwet-maakt-vervallen-paspoort-enidentiteitskaart-jihadgangers-mogelijk.
150. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 12(2), 12(4), Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
151. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
arts. 2(2), 3(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, as amended by Protocol 4, Strasbourg,
16.IX.1963.
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broader conditions conducive to terrorism and extremist ideologies.152 The
U.N. working group on mercenaries has stated in a report on foreign terrorist fighters that “preventive approaches must be balanced with repressive approaches,” including prosecutions, and “[b]lanket attempts to prosecute all aspiring and returning foreign fighters could have a radicalizing effect and reinforce recruitment narratives.”153
This balance is not necessarily easy to strike. There has been some criticism by commentators in the Netherlands that the criminal law framework
is being reverted to too easily to address the threat of foreign terrorist
fighters. These commentators argue that criminal law is increase-ingly considered as an optimum remedium, where it should be an ultimum remedium.154
Whatever views one holds on the proper role of criminal law in combating
terrorism, there is no doubt that the Netherlands has put in place many
measures promoting a “soft” approach. These include, inter alia, multiannual consultations with imams on the government’s approach to radicalization, education, discrimination and Islamophobia; appointment of a national confidential advisor to support key figures in the Muslim community
who promote an alternative view and take a stand against jihadism; and establishment of a national advisory center to offer support to family members and associates of radicalized individuals or jihadist travelers and assistance, under strict conditions, to extremists who wish to escape the jihadist
movement.155
When looking at the specific measures discussed in this article, one
conclusion that may be drawn is that they illustrate the close relationship
between international law and domestic law in the field of counterterrorism. This relationship consists of different strands. The first strand is the
implementation of international obligations in domestic law. There are
many international instruments relating to terrorism generally and an increasing number that focus specifically on foreign terrorist fighters. The
prime example of the latter is Security Council Resolution 2178.156 The implementation of these instruments often requires States to take measures in
152. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/28, Sept. 12, 2014, ¶¶ 36–39.
153. Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, supra note 6, ¶ 78.
154. See e.g., Andreas Kouwenhoven & Sheila Kamerman, “Strafrecht Misbruikt bij
Aanpak Terrorisme,” NRC HANDELSBLAD (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nrc.nl/next/2015/
11/02/strafrecht-misbruikt-bij-aanpak-jihadisme-1552110.
155. Parliamentary Papers II, 29754, No. 253, supra note 5, at 17–20.
156. Another example is Additional Protocol to Council Terrorist Convention, supra
note 21.
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their domestic law, including criminalizing certain conduct. When measures
taken on the basis of domestic implementation are brought before the
courts, national judges may look to the international instrument “behind”
the national law in interpreting the latter. This may be made more difficult
by the ambiguous drafting of the international instrument concerned, as
illustrated by the Dutch courts’ grappling with the interpretation of exclusion clauses, in particular preambular paragraph 11 of the European
Framework Decision.
This discussion also illustrates a second strand, namely the relationship
between international instruments dealing with terrorism on the one hand
and IHL on the other hand. The attempts by Dutch courts to clarify this
relationship are a welcome development. This author considers that the
approach taken by these courts, which focuses on the distinction between
international and non-international armed conflicts, is sound under lex lata.
A third strand consists of limitations imposed by international law on
measures under domestic law. Of particular importance is State respect for
human rights obligations when taking measures domestically. As illustrated
by the human rights concerns that have been leveled at bills introduced by
the government relating to deprivation of nationality, measures to combat
foreign terrorist fighters have an impact on human rights. Whether such
measures remain within the limits of a State’s human rights obligations depends, in addition to the nature of the measures concerned, on the human
rights obligations of that specific State. For the Netherlands, the main
point of reference is the ECHR and European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence. Thus far, the measures taken by the Netherlands in combating
foreign terrorist fighters have not come before that Court.
A final conclusion concerns cooperation. The discussion of different
measures has underlined the need for cooperation between different actors
within the Dutch legal system and between different Dutch governmental
agencies and units. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is largely
dependent on the AIVD and the Public Prosecution Service to provide the
information necessary to freeze assets. Similarly, information provided by
the AIVD may be the trigger for a criminal investigation and prosecution
by the Public Prosecution Service. Cooperation between national and municipal authorities is required for the revocation of passports.
In the Netherlands, the National Coordinator for Combating Terrorism and for Security (Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, NCTV) plays an important role in fostering interagency cooperation. This institution was created in 2005 for that specific purpose. Coop233
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eration is not only required at the national level, however. By definition,
foreign terrorist fighters cross borders between States. The threat they represent can be addressed effectively only if the different States involved,
sending States, transit States and receiving States, increase and strengthen
their cooperation. It is the need for cooperation that appears to be the
most important challenge in the immediate future.157

157. It may be noted that the Netherlands is actively involved in efforts to strengthen
such cooperation, inter alia in its capacity as co-Chair of the Global Counter Terrorism
Forum (GCTF). For example, cooperation was an important theme at the joint meeting of
the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Groups of the Global Counterterrorism Forum
and the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL/Da’esh, convened by the Netherlands on 16
January 2016. See Minister Koenders Convenes Major Counterterrorism Conference in the Hague, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.the-nether
lands.org/news/2016/01/global-counterterrorism-forum.html.
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